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Abstract
The defeat of the military uprising on 19 July 1936 in Barcelona and Valencia unleashed the process of the collectivisation of compa-
nies, which came to be managed by committees comprised of their own workers. The anarcho-syndicalists were identified with this 
change, which the overwhelmed Republican authorities tried to channel. In the region studied, collectivisation was more important in 
industry than in agriculture. The critical anti-fascist testimonials of the phenomenon allow us to temper the versions of the propagan-
dists, who blamed all the flaws in the process on its adversaries. Decentralised worker management lost ground after the test of 
strength in Barcelona in May 1937.
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The collapse of the repressive apparatus of the Republican 
State after the defeat in the military coup on the 19th of 
July 1936 left business and land owners defenceless. 
Without this denouement, anarcho-syndicalists and 
Marxists from different organisations would have never 
had the chance to impose a collectivist transformation of 
companies and farms. It is not easy to get a precise idea of 
how this collectivisation worked and how far it extended 
in Catalonia and the Region of Valencia after August 
1936, despite the invaluable literature that serves as the 
foundation of this article. However, it is easier if we exam-
ine the militant stories by the reporters from that time 
who had strong ideological leanings and were thus in-
clined to adopt the role of glorifiers or detractors of this 
experience. The attractive official organisational charts 
from that period show a controlled economy which 
sought to combine worker management in companies 
with disciplined coordination by the Catalan republican 
political authorities. But these organisational charts have 
little to do with a complex, contradictory reality which re-
sists historiographic synthesis, just as in its day it resisted 
planned rationalisation.
It would be ingenuous to continue to see collectivisa-
tions as a spontaneous working-class phenomenon with-
out the intervention the union delegates in companies 
and the revolutionary committees in the field. The fact 
that there was no previous specific programme and that 
neither instructions nor public directives were issued 
from the top committees of the trade union federations – 
CNT and UGT – does not mean that it was a spontaneous 
process that sprang from the workers.1 In the case of the 
Barcelona company Riviere and others, the Metallurgy 
Union of the CNT clearly gave the initial instructions and 
the workers took it over out of a need for continuity, not 
to launch a radical change process, thus casting doubt on 
the thesis of spontaneity. The priorities of the trade union 
federations were a military offensive which ended up sta-
bilising a front in Aragon and persecuting possible sup-
porters of the uprising in the rear-guard.2 However, these 
priorities in no way meant that socioeconomic changes 
did not come into play from the very start. Even though in 
this article we will focus on these changes instead of on 
political evolution, without references to these political 
shifts we cannot possibly study the evolution in the socio-
economic changes.
Very early on the streetcars and buses of Barcelona 
wore the red and black libertarian flag on their struc-
tures with the abbreviation of the Confederación Na-
cional del Trabajo (National Labour Confederation, 
CNT). At that point, the anarcho-syndicalists held the 
city’s transports in their hands after the strikes, dismiss-
als, attacks and sabotages that had been taking place 
since late 1933.3
The Generalitat de Catalunya created the Consell 
d’Economia de Catalunya (Economic Council of Catalo-
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nia) on the 11th of August 1936 in order to provide guide-
lines, but it was not easy to reach agreement among the 
other sectors and the CNT-FAI (Federació Anarquista 
Ibèrica, or Iberian Anarchist Federation), which seemed 
to have a hegemony at that time with weapons in hand. 
The Generalitat’s Regional Minister for the Economy, Jo-
sep Tarradellas, presided over the Council and led the ne-
gotiations. On the 24th of October 1936, the decree on col-
lectivisations and worker control over industry in 
Catalonia was published, a compromise given that it strove 
to save small enterprises from collectivisation and left ag-
riculture and finances outside the scope of the text. The 
CNT-FAI had entered the government of the Generalitat 
on the 27th of September, along with the Partit Socialista 
Unificat de Catalunya (Unified Socialist Party of Catalo-
nia, or PSUC, which followed the communist line but was 
formally independent from the Partido Comunista de Es-
paña, or Communist Party of Spain) and the Partit Obrer 
d’Unificació Marxista (Marxist Workers’ Unification Par-
ty, or POUM). The revolutionary committees in the towns 
had been dissolved into the new town halls, which were 
supposed to have a composition equivalent to what they 
had had during the first government of Josep Tarradellas, 
who was now the chief minister and head of government 
and had presided over the Economic Council from its 
start. This first step towards overcoming the atomisation 
of power came prior to regulation of the economic and so-
cial changes, even though it was very difficult to coherent-
ly implement the decree from the 24th of October.
We should distinguish between the different territories 
because the role of the political regional authorities was 
extremely important as a legislating and organising 
framework. In the case of Catalonia, the existence of an 
autonomous government, the Generalitat de Catalunya, 
whose de facto competences were expanded by the war 
until May 1937, is different to the case of the Region of 
Valencia, which had neither a regional government nor a 
statute of autonomy. Prior to July 1936, the Front Popular 
(Popular Front) organisations in the Region of Valencia 
had sought to promote a draft statute of autonomy which 
was, however, frustrated by the war. Power was also at-
omised in the Region of Valencia. In the province of Va-
lencia, the Comitè Executiu Popular (People’s Executive 
Committee), made up of the parties in the Popular Front 
plus the CNT and the UGT, which were allies, acted with 
the autonomous government yet without encompassing 
the entire region.4 The collectivisation process went fur-
ther than the leftist republicans and communists were 
willing to take on. The arrival of the government of the 
Republic to Valencia, presided over by the socialist Largo 
Caballero with four anarcho-syndicalist ministers, led to 
the disappearance of the People’s Executive Committee in 
January 1937. However, before that, in early December it 
had approved the bases regulating industrial collectivisa-
tions which had been submitted by the Economic Council 
of Valencia, which was dominated by the CNT and UGT. 
They followed patterns that were quite similar to those in 
the Catalan decree from late October 1936, but they were 
formally more radical given that they stipulated the col-
lectivisation of companies with more than 50 workers. 
However, the Economic Council of Valencia was en-
meshed in a crisis by February 1937 and disappeared in 
June of the same year.
A collectivisation took place in the eastern part of 
Aragon, which was occupied by the columns from Cata-
lonia, which the Consejo de Aragón (Council of Aragon), 
dominated by anarchists and lasting until August 1937, 
strove to coordinate.
Secondly, we must distinguish between industry and 
agriculture. While industrial collectivisation was more 
important than agrarian collectivisation in Catalonia, 
where individual, family-owned farms continued to pre-
dominate, the same cannot be said of the Region of Va-
lencia, where agrarian collectivisation was more impor-
tant than its industrial counterpart. 
Figure 1. In February 1937, a bus from the Barcelona public trans-
port system, which had been collectivised by the CNT, runs in front 
of the Hotel Colón, in Plaça de Catalunya, a building seized by the 
Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Unified Socialist Party of 
Catalonia, PSUC), which was a member of the Communist Interna-
tional, with the effigies of Lenin and Stalin and a propaganda poster 
for the Unió General de Treballadors (General Workers’ Union), 
which was controlled by the PSUC. Author: Agustí Centelles.
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport. Centro Documental de 
la Memoria Histórica. Centelles Archive, photo. 3394.
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Thirdly, we must distinguish between periods, given 
that the phenomenon of collectivisation embarked upon 
in the summer of 1936 began to be questioned and to re-
treat from the summer of 1937 until the end of the war, 
giving way instead to nationalisation, a synonym for 
statalisation. 
Finally, we should bear in mind the different correla-
tions of forces in the unions. In Catalonia, the CNT clear-
ly predominated. It was led by the most unyielding anar-
chist sectors, even though most of the adversary 
syndicalist minority of the FAI, which had split off be-
tween 1932 and 1933, rejoined the CNT in August 1936. 
However, there were a few notorious exceptions, such as 
the union federation of Sabadell, which went to the UGT. 
In Catalonia, the UGT, which had been paltry until then, 
underwent a period of growth that by late 1936 had 
brought it closer to the CNT in terms of the number of 
members. In Catalonia, the UGT, under the direction of 
the PSUC, represented a moderate counterweight to the 
libertarians.5 However, in the Region of Valencia, there 
had always been a balance of forces between the CNT and 
the UGT. Additionally, within the CNT more moderate 
syndicalists dominated over diehard anarchists. At the 
same time, leftist leanings predominated within the UGT 
in the Region of Valencia, while the socialist union in the 
countryside had grown more than the CNT. The affinity 
between both unions was greater in Valencia than in Cat-
alonia, which allowed them to work together more closely 
in the former than in the latter.
The collectivisation process in Catalan 
industry until autumn 1937
We must first distinguish between two means of collec-
tivisation: first, companies collectivised by their workers, 
and secondly clusters or concentrations of production or 
service companies led by the unions in the sector, which 
were generally local but also on a regional scale in some 
cases. Both kinds were regulated by the decree on collec-
tivisations issued by the government of the Generalitat de 
Catalunya on the 24th of October 1936, which the anar-
cho-syndicalists, socialists, communists and unified so-
cialists of the PSUC and dissenting communists of the 
POUM had joined in late September, in addition to the 
Unió de Rabassaires i altres Cultivadors del Camp de Cat-
alunya (Union of Smallholders and other Farmers of Cat-
alonia, URC). The latter had been present in the Catalan 
government since late July of that year through their top 
leader, Josep Calvet, who served as the Regional Minister 
of Agriculture throughout the entire war.6
In theory, we should bear in mind the general econom-
ic and political framework of the Generalitat. The eco-
nomic difficulties stemming from the Civil War often 
conditioned the success or failure of the revolutionary 
change. Furthermore, the Catalan economy was faced 
with the need to transform part of its manufacturing in-
dustry for the war without there previously having been 
any arms industry in the region, and this primarily affect-
ed metallurgy and chemistry. At the same time, it was suf-
fering from the loss of the peninsular markets which were 
in the hands of the enemies of the Republic, and it was 
difficult to penetrate alternative markets given the inter-
national trade restrictions imposed by governments be-
cause of the Great Depression triggered in 1929. It was 
also quite difficult to import the raw materials and fuels 
needed – and this primarily affected the consumer goods 
industries such as textiles – given the government of the 
Republic’s understandable priority to earmark any cur-
rency available to purchase arms and basic foodstuffs 
abroad. Catalonia depended on the acquisition of prod-
ucts from the rest of Spain for basic subsistence, and it 
was facing an increasingly steep deficit which was only 
worsened by the entry of a wave of refugees, who came to 
account for one-third of the population before the war. 
This influx was later compounded by the arrival of civil 
servants from the central power who moved to Barcelona 
with the government of the Republic in October 1937. 
The situation was even further exacerbated with Catalo-
nia’s isolation by land from the rest of the Iberian Penin-
sula after April 1938. The deprivation became severe and 
rationing was not enough.
The fact that a considerable part of Catalan industry 
was devoted to war manufacturing was one of the factors, 
albeit not the only one, in the inflation that soon devoured 
the salary increases decreed at the beginning of the con-
flict, when the Generalitat lowered the workweek to 40 
hours and ordered a 15% rise in salaries under 500 pesetas 
per month. While the cost of living quadrupled over the 
course of the conflict, salaries only doubled. Industrial 
production dropped from an index of 100 in early 1936 to 
an index of 70 by February 1937 and 55 by April 1938. 
The sectors that were not linked to war manufacturing 
suffered the consequences of preferential treatment to-
wards the war industry. The imbalances between the pro-
ductive capacity and the allocation of resources contrib-
uted to the spiral of inflation and the steadiness of 
unemployment rates, which were not neutralised enough 
by the different drafts called up, even though they did not 
truly begin until the summer of 1937.7
The Comissió d’Indústries de Guerra (War Industries 
Commission, CIG) of the Generalitat de Catalunya pro-
moted the conversion of an industry like Catalonia’s into 
the wartime production, which it did not have prior to the 
conflict.8 Around 500 workshops and factories with a to-
tal of between 50,000 and 80,000 workers were managed 
by the CIG, usually without having to be seized. 
Collectivisation demonstrated the management capac-
ity and sense of responsibility of some workers, but it also 
had flaws at first, as explained in an almost official leaflet 
issued in February 1937 by the secretary of the commis-
sion whose job it was to implement the decree from the 
24th of October 1936, Albert Pérez Baró, who was a well-
informed and somewhat equanimous witness. He stated 
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that industry had been taken over by a lack of discipline 
under the belief that everything had already been won. 
Seeking to enlarge their membership, the unions often let 
undisciplined members slide, which harmed society as a 
whole and was at odds with the company councils which 
protected the interests of the factory they represented. 
While the Generalitat created an office to pay the wages of 
companies that were indebted and lacking many guaran-
tees for months, other companies which were perfectly 
competitive found no official support to purchase the raw 
materials they needed.9
To avoid chaos and to redress the situation, on the 11th 
of August 1936, the Generalitat created the Economic 
Council of Catalonia, where the different anti-fascist forces 
negotiated what would become the Decree on Collectivisa-
tions and Worker Control from the 24th of October 1936. 
This was a compromise with all the advantages and disad-
vantages of such a transaction, since it strove to guarantee 
small business ownership while at the same time legitimise 
and control collectivisation and clusters.10 Companies with 
more than 100 workers and those abandoned by their own-
ers and managers were obligatorily collectivised, and their 
management was placed in the hands of company councils 
periodically elected by a workers’ assembly. Companies 
with fewer than 100 but more than 50 workers could be col-
lectivised if two-thirds of their salaried workers so wished. 
Companies with fewer than 50 workers continued to be 
governed by their owners, but they were supervised by an 
overseeing workers’ council.
The company councils elected their representatives to 
the general industry councils, fourteen of which were 
formed, though the majority not until the autumn of 
1937. They were only made up of the representatives of 
the CNT and the UGT, along with the experts appointed 
by the Economic Council, but they did not have repre-
sentatives of the workers in the collectivised companies 
because of a census issue. The general industry councils, 
along with the two major unions and the experts appoint-
ed by the Generalitat, were represented on the Economic 
Council, the top steering and planning body. Neither the 
unionisation of industry – even though the clusters were 
unions – which is what the anarcho-syndicalists wanted, 
nor state nationalisation, as the Marxists wanted, existed, 
but instead grassroots worker management, albeit with 
supreme direct control. The profits from the collectivised 
enterprises were not to be privately appropriated; rather, 
half of the earnings was supposed to be placed in a large 
official credit fund run by the Generalitat, which granted 
loans according to the collective interests. It thus became 
an instrument of discipline because companies that did 
not follow the general price and salary guidelines and oth-
er provisions were excluded.
It should be borne in mind that banking was super-
vised and controlled but not collectivised. However, the 
Figure 2. Image of one of the restaurants that was collectivised, located on the corner of the Rambla with Carrer Nou de Barcelona, known 
as “El Trincall”.
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official savings and loan was not created until late 1937. 
The shortcomings in the system were therefore due not 
solely to the workers and unions but also to the Generali-
tat itself. Without that financial body there could be nei-
ther order nor harmony in the new collectivised econo-
my. To explain this delay we should bear in mind minister 
Tarradellas’ scant interest in creating this savings and 
loan, along with the anarcho-syndicalists’ reluctance to 
accept the principle of indemnifications for expropria-
tions which the project advocated. The anarcho-syndical-
ists’ departure from the government of the Generalitat in 
June 1937 paved the way as the Economic Council lost 
importance within the government of the Generalitat to 
the minister of the sector, Joan Comorera, the secretary 
general of the PSUC, instead of a member of the CNT as 
until then.
The decree on collectivisations sought to maintain 
small industrial and commercial enterprises, as well as 
small farms, and this reflected the determination to pre-
serve the anti-fascist front, which was inter-classist, as 
stressed by the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Re-
publican Left of Catalonia, ERC) and the PSUC. The goal 
was to avoid social disintegration within Catalonia. Thus, 
limits were placed on socialisation as it was viewed by the 
anarchists. It was wise not to break the already delicate 
balance between small business owners, independent 
producers and salaried workers.
In reality, industrial collectivisation had gone further 
than what the decree dated the 24th of October 1936 had 
established a posteriori. Thus, in the cotton textile indus-
try, which was extremely important in Catalonia at the 
time, 54% of the weaving companies had at most 50 
looms, and this meant that the majority of them did not 
have more than 50 workers and would have thus been ex-
cluded from the collectivisation. Nonetheless, a propa-
ganda book from 1937 entitled Colectivizaciones. La obra 
constructiva de la revolució said that only 10% of all busi-
ness owners in the textile industries remained at the helm 
of their companies.11 What is more, there were also clus-
ters or concentrations – not always voluntary – of small 
business owners under the leadership of their union sec-
tor. These groups were legally governed by the same rules 
as established in the decree dated the 24th of October 
1936 for the collectivisation of individual companies.
The Minister of the Economy of the Generalitat who 
signed the decree on collectivisation, Joan P. Fàbregas, 
wanted to leave testimony of his stewardship in his book 
published in 1937 entitled Vuitanta dies al Govern de la 
Generalitat. El que vaig fer i el que no em deixaren fer. He 
represented the CNT in the Catalan government between 
the 27th of September 1936 and the 18th of December of 
the same year. He declared that he had wanted to imple-
ment social mobilisation in the rear-guard yet never man-
aged to do so. He viewed it as necessary, in his words, to 
“restore social discipline and instate a single direction on 
the economic front”. To win the war, he even sought to 
temporarily expand the workday. Fàbregas attributed his 
fall and the political crisis of December 1936 to the bour-
geois counter-revolution, even though the communists 
were oblivious to this as they triggered it by excluding 
Andreu Nin and the POUM from the Catalan govern-
ment. Nor did Fàbregas manage to carry out an economic 
census of Catalonia. Fàbregas clung to the thesis that the 
governing crisis in December 1936 with the exclusion of 
the POUM at the demand of the PSUC reflected a “family 
feud” that did not affect the anarcho-syndicalists, a thesis 
that the events of May 1937 would later contradict.
We could say that until May 1937, the reality of the col-
lectivisation of Catalan industry had gone further than 
what the compromise in the decree dated the 24th of Oc-
tober 1936 had stipulated. Meanwhile, after May 1937 the 
process was gradually redirected to become increasingly 
restrictive and interventionist by the government of the 
Generalitat, with Joan Comorera at the helm of the De-
partment of the Economy, once the CNT-FAI was outside 
the governments of the Republic and the Generalitat. Af-
ter August 1937, Manuel Serra i Moret, a Catalanist so-
cial-democrat and member of the PUSC, presided over 
Catalonia’s Economic Council, but he later left the PSUC 
Figure 3. Poster which says “Collectivised mattress industry 
workers” from the Sindicato Único de la Industria Fabril, Textil, 
Vestir y Anexos (Single Union of the Fabric, Textile and Clothing 
and Related Industries) of Barcelona, C.N.T.-A.I.T. (1937). 100 x 
70 cm. Author: unknown. 
CRAI Biblioteca Pavelló de la República (Universitat de Barcelona). 
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after the war. Serra i Moret discussed this experience in 
his book published in Buenos Aires in 1942, La recon-
strucción económica de España.
On the other hand, with the decree from the 24th of 
October 1936, the Generalitat had stretched beyond the 
boundaries of the Catalan statute of 1932. After the events 
of May 1937, the Generalitat found itself increasingly in-
hibited by the government of the Republic, especially af-
ter it moved from Valencia to Barcelona in October 1937. 
At the same time, the Comissió d’Indústries de Guerra 
(War Industries Commission), created by the Generalitat 
el on the 8th of August 1936, was gradually losing power 
as well. It was a difficult task to convert an industry that 
was wholly oriented at civilian manufacturing into arms 
production, which had never before existed in Catalonia. 
Without resorting to either nationalisation or expropria-
tion, the War Industries Commission acted as an inspect-
ing body through its commissions in the metallurgy and 
chemical sectors. By October 1936, 230 production units 
with 60,000 workers plus 30,000 assistants were working 
under its charge. However, after the summer of 1937, as 
the Under-Secretariat of Armaments of the government 
of the Republic was nationalising these companies, work-
er management, which was associated with collectivisa-
tion, stopped in them and was replaced by a vertical pow-
er structure until the militarisation of the war industries 
decreed in August 1938 was achieved.
The justification of the militarisation of the war indus-
try in Catalonia was to overcome its poor performance. 
Thus, the delegate of the Communist International in 
Spain, Togliatti, reported to Moscow that arms produc-
tion in Catalonia began to be satisfactory during the sec-
ond half of 1938 thanks to the intervention of Negrín’s 
government. However, a less ideological testimony, yet 
one as informed as that of Colonel Vicenç Guarner, reads: 
“The spirit of absorption of the central government, 
which moved to Barcelona in October 1937, put an end to 
that entire organisation without improving it by intro-
ducing a huge communistic bureaucracy in the guise of 
totally ineffectual management teams”.12
In any event, in 1938 the war was lost for the Republi-
can cause, and in the war industry it was futile to assign 
blame to any party in a counter-factual historical vein. 
Those who claimed that if a more authoritarian system 
had been in place earlier the Republic could have won the 
war not only ignored a series of other major factors that 
explained the outcome but also underestimated the effort 
made by the workers and technicians of Catalonia. In any 
event, when they returned in 1939, the majority of owners 
did not find their companies any worse off than they had 
been before the war, and some of them even got their 
companies back in an improved state.
By October of 1937, Catalan textile production only ac-
counted for 25% of the monthly average in the first half of 
1936, and metallurgy was hardly faring better given that it 
only accounted for a little over 62% of the production 
from the same period in the initial reference. Despite that, 
metallurgy rallied until March 1938 and seems to have 
shown positive results until September 1938. Despite the 
dearth of general statistics, the production figures for 
MACOSA, one of the largest and most representative na-
tionalised companies, show that in September 1938 its 
production was equivalent to 80% of the monthly average 
in the first half of 1936. This figure seems to indicate a 
positive result from the government of the Republic’s na-
tionalising intervention in the war industry compared to 
the previous system in Catalonia. However, production in 
this same company dropped to a level equivalent to 40% 
after October 1938 compared to before the war.13
The clusters
But let us go back to the beginning. There were business 
owners who along with their workers were trying to avoid 
collectivisation by converting their companies into coop-
eratives in order to benefit from the advantages and fiscal 
perks of the 1934 Catalan law. However, the Generalitat 
ended up assimilating these cooperatives created after 
July 1936 into the collectives for all monitoring and taxa-
tion purposes. 
Figure 4. Poster of the Sindicato Único de Barberos (Single Bar-
bers’ Union) (1937). 63 x 43 cm. Author: Ricard Obiols.
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With regard to the clusters promoted by the unions in 
the CNT, most of them were local, including all or most 
small business owners in an entire sector, such as the bar-
bers, bakers, carpenters and construction workers in Bar-
celona. However, there were some regional ones as well, 
such as the gas and electricity utilities.14 The clusters 
strove to implement social security, which did not yet ex-
ist generally, on a sectorial basis. The cluster of the textile 
and clothing manufacturing industry of Badalona, spear-
headed by the CNT, encompassed 34 of the 37 local facto-
ries in this sector with a total of 8,000 workers. It managed 
to be legalised, and thanks to the Minister of Defence, it 
secured imported raw materials and remained in opera-
tion until the end of the war.
In February of 1937, the Economic Council of Catalo-
nia received numerous complaints from small business 
owners who were being coerced into joining the clusters. 
They were from a variety of sectors, such as the owners of 
creameries in Barcelona who often supplied milk to the 
different neighbourhoods in the city.15
According to union documentation, the clusters si-
multaneously achieved rationalisation based on econo-
mies of scale to lower the production and service units, 
absorb unemployment, increase productivity and sala-
ries, eliminate intermediaries and decrease consumer 
prices. It is difficult to believe that all of these objectives, 
some of which are formally incompatible with each oth-
er, could be achieved at the same time, even in an autar-
chic economy like that one. The defenders of the clusters 
have limited themselves to attributing all the difficulties 
not to internal flaws but to the boycotts by the enemies of 
the clusters: the ERC and the PSUC. While the Depart-
ment of Economy of the Generalitat was in the hands of 
the CNT, 98 clusters were legalised, but this came to an 
end after October 1937. The Generalitat was willing to 
listen to the complaints of the small producers who 
wanted to leave the clusters or resisted entering them in 
the first place. There were also clusters governed by anar-
chists who did not want to accept the controls and bur-
dens entailed by the legalisation. In his Memòries, Josep 
Benet explains the case of a barber, a neighbour of his, 
who had always lived in the flat above his barber shop, 
but after his trade was made into a cluster he had to work 
at the other end of the city while another barber occupied 
his modest business. This barber, who held democratic 
and republican ideas, awaited the victory of General 
Franco to back get his barber shop near his home. Jordi 
Solé Tura, who was the leader of the PSUC before and 
after the 1977 transition, recounted in his memoirs that 
his mother, the owner of a bakery in Mollet del Vallès, 
had her small business collectivised and was reduced to 
being a mere clerk, while the only worker she had em-
ployed started to run the bakery, following the union’s 
decision. In 1939, the situation returned to what it had 
been before the war.
In the case of Riegos y Fuerzas del Ebro, since “la 
Canadenca”, the largest electricity company in Catalonia, 
had foreign capital, its right to indemnification in an un-
determined future had to be recognised. The managing 
technicians had to leave Catalonia upon orders from the 
management of the multinational SOFINA. This issue of 
companies with foreign capital was one of the major hur-
dles in the collectivisation process, with reprisals levelled 
by the managers of companies that were headquartered in 
countries that were not under fascist regimes and had not 
broken ties with the Republic.
After the events of May 1937, and with the CNT-FAI 
outside the governments of the Republic and the Gener-
alitat, the nationalising trends continued to the detriment 
of worker management. The inspectors from the Gener-
alitat in collectivised companies, which used to be pro-
posed by the works council and had to be appointed with 
their agreement, could now be rejected by the Generalitat, 
which could appoint others instead. A decree dated the 
20th of November 1937 allowed the Generalitat to na-
tionalise collectivised companies. By the end of the first 
quarter of 1938, 15 large companies had been national-
ised in this way.
One point that cannot be forgotten in the Economy 
Council’s decisions was the municipalisation of housing. 
After the 19th of July 1936, rents ceased being paid, ad-
vertisements offering flats for rent disappeared, the con-
struction crisis already underway was seriously magnified 
with a rise in unemployment, and confiscations of com-
mercial spaces and flats by political organisations of the 
Popular Front and unions increased the uncertainty of 
the future of urban homeownership. The Generalitat 
tried to salvage the principle of property ownership 
through its decree dated the 12th of August 1936 which 
lowered rentals under 201 pesetas by 50% and those be-
tween 201 and 301 pesetas by 25%. However, this devalu-
ation was futile.
The first time that the theory of the municipalisation of 
housing appeared was in the CNT-FAI/UGT-PSUC 
agreement from late 1936. The Economy Council did not 
approve the decree on the municipalisation of housing 
until the 11th of June 1937, even though different munici-
palities had already implemented it. The non-factious 
owners received titles for the cadastral value of their as-
sets to be paid back in 25 years at 4% annual interest. The 
decree stipulated the exception of houses inhabited by 
their owners and those regarded as low-income, along 
with certain indemnifications for the previous owners. A 
housing bank was created in each municipality to imple-
ment the transfer and charge the rent. This led to the de 
facto syndicalisation of urban property, given that two-
thirds of the steering councils of these housing banks 
were made up of representatives of the two unions: CNT 
and UGT. No housing bank was ever actually established 
in Barcelona.
Regarding public urban transport and the water, gas 
and electricity utilities, the controversy continued be-
tween the PSUC’s thesis that they should be municipal-
ised and the CNT-FAI’s defence of imposed collectivisa-
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tions and clusters. The first option was more promising 
after Joan Comorera, the secretary general of the PSUC, 
reached the helm of the Department of the Economy of 
the Generalitat in June 1937. However, the anarcho-syn-
dicalists retained the positions they had achieved.
A monographic perspective
Monographs on companies are few and far between, 
though extremely valuable. We have one on the Barcelo-
na-based metallurgy company Riviere, which specialised 
in triple-twisted grating. This study combines documen-
tation from the company and union with interviews with 
workers, the latter quite difficult to find.16 Riviere had 
around 1,000 workers in its three factories located in 
Poble Nou, Badalona and Can Tunis. Can Tunis is where 
the work was the most taxing and the workers’ positions 
the most radical, and it had the highest proportion of im-
migrants from the rest of Spain. What is more, the office 
was in Barcelona, where the workers were affiliated with 
the UGT, while the manual labourers were members of 
the CNT. The vast majority of Riviere workers passively 
followed the collectivisation and did not regard the com-
pany as more ‘theirs’ than prior to it. The company 
worked for the War Industries Commission until No-
vember 1937, when it was requisitioned with others by 
the Under-Secretary of Armament of the government of 
the Republic as Factory L.
The initial pact among different inclinations at Riviere 
can be explained by the need to continue production and 
to retain mid-level, technical and administrative staff who 
in practice served as a counterbalance to the more radical 
workers. The owners’ assets were requisitioned and as-
signed to the company, beginning with six houses with 
yards, in one of which the one of the owner’s sons was 
found; he was arrested but later released. The owners’ be-
longings were given to the workers after drawing lots, and 
the product was earmarked as a war donation. During the 
first half of 1937, the clashes between militant CNT work-
ers and the company board became more heated, leading 
to interventions by the CNT union. In the summer of 
1937, union intervention led to a total predominance of 
manual labourers and CNT members over office workers 
and UGT members, with a complete shift in the company 
board. However, this change was not accepted by the 
Generalitat, and in September 1937 it imposed a rectifica-
tion to achieve a greater balance between unions and in-
clinations. Three months later, worker management dis-
appeared at Riviere when it was requisitioned by the 
Under-Secretary of Armament, nine months before the 
militarisation of the war industry factories decreed in Au-
gust 1938. Those changes did not prompt resistance be-
cause the collectivist spirit had lost the momentum it had 
had earlier and the military situation in the Republic was 
increasingly precarious. In the case of Riviere, the com-
pensation seems to have been an improvement in the 
food rations received by workers.
During the war, the machinery, facilities, manufactur-
ing process and physical working conditions at Riviere 
improved. There was a sense of responsibility, and the 
workers’ capacity was proven despite the union rivalries. 
The retaliation when the owners returned in 1939 led to 
the dismissal of the most prominent CNT members, but 
their more moderate counterparts remained in the facto-
ry unless they had been members of the company council. 
The proportion of dismissals was 18%, with a maximum 
of 22.5% at the Can Tunis factory and a minimum of 11% 
in the Barcelona office. The owners found themselves 
overseeing materials that they had not purchased and im-
proved facilities.
The other set of monographs can be found in a book on 
collectivisations in the Baix Llobregat.17 At that time, 
L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, a town adjacent to Barcelona, 
had 40,000 inhabitants. Half of its working-class popula-
tion worked in the textile industry, and L’Hospitalet was 
the home to large companies like Tecla Sala and Trinxet. 
Around 8.6% of the workforce in the town was employed 
in the metallurgy sector in companies like Altos Hornos 
de Cataluña, and only 10% was farmers. L’Hospitalet had 
a high percentage of recent immigrants from Murcia and 
Andalusia, and it was a fiefdom of the CNT, which in this 
town was dominated by the most intransigent anarchism.
Figure 5. Poster advertising the collectivisation of Barcelona’s 
public transport companies during the Civil War. 100 x 70 cm. Au-
thor: Ricard Obiols. 1936. 
Catalan Historical Review 10.indb   84 17/07/17   12:56
Collectivisations in Catalonia and the Region of Valencia during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939  Cat. Hist. Rev. 10, 2017   85
In the case of companies in the Baix Llobregat, it has 
been proven that the employers of the more than 1,000 
workers immediately disappeared, and even some techni-
cians left, but there does not seem to have been any major 
problem owing to a lack of technicians. In the companies 
studied with 125 to 160 workers, the owners did not flee, 
and with the exception of two of the cases they participat-
ed in running the companies. Even though in most cases 
they were not allowed to participate in the works council, 
they did have regular interactions with the members of 
the respective committee. On the other hand, the repre-
sentatives of the administrative staff on the works council 
tended to play the role of representatives of the former 
owners.
The most serious problems were due to the lack of raw 
materials, market contraction and the lack of electricity 
after the spring of 1938. Most of the companies studied in 
the Baix Llobregat were in the textile industry – such as 
the Güell industrial colonies in Santa Coloma de Cervelló 
and the Sedó colony in Esparraguera18 – and showed a 
high proportion of female workers. However, female rep-
resentation on the works councils elected by the workers’ 
assembly was insignificant. The formation of factory 
workers’ committees, which were not stipulated in the de-
cree on collectivisations, reflected two factors: the official 
marginalisation of the unions in the management of col-
lectivised companies (even though the works councils 
had union members on them) and the marginalisation of 
women in the textile sector. There was a committee of this 
kind in four of the seven companies studied in the Baix 
Llobregat. In no way was there always a climate of tension 
and clashes between the elected management committee 
and the factory workers’ committees, and there were even 
cases of collaboration in the distribution of jobs, as the 
jobs of the works council were absorbed by everyday eco-
nomic management. However, the formation of factory 
committees indicates that there was a dearth of harmony 
between the less qualified workers and the new worker 
management of the company, a shortcoming which can 
clearly be seen in the average attendance figures at the 
workers’ assemblies: never more than one-third of the 
staff except in extraordinary cases.
The studies that exist on the industry in the Baix Llo-
bregat indicate the incidence of the actions by the union-
ists who had split off from the CNT in 1933 over discrep-
ancies with its insurrectionist line and the direct 
confrontation with management and political authorities 
sponsored by the FAI. For example, until 1936 the Sedó 
colony was aligned with the local union federations in 
Sabadell and Manresa which had split off from the CNT. 
When the workers at the Sedó colony returned to the 
CNT in 1936, some of them shifted allegiance to the UGT, 
which thus came to this company quite late, in the middle 
of the war. They had the example of the federation of un-
ions of Sabadell, which shifted en masse to the UGT in the 
summer of 1936, four years after having leaving the CNT.
In the early days of the Civil War, there was a trend 
among the moderate unionists – most of whom had re-
joined the CNT – to work on company boards, that is, in 
economic management, while the more unyielding anar-
chists tended to work in the different local committees, 
militias, control patrols and the Nova Escola Unificada 
(New Unified School).
In contrast to the salary equity in the agricultural col-
lectivisations, in the industrial ones in the Baix Llobregat 
studied to date the pre-existing salary hierarchy was re-
spected, even though this caused controversies within 
companies. The economic continuity was considerable 
despite the difficulties external to collectivisation. In the 
case of the Sedó colony, in a 1939 survey the owners ad-
mitted that they had not found the company in poor con-
dition but instead the warehoused products enabled the 
company to cope with the post-war years with some sense 
of assurance.
Oral history has revealed that to a considerable number 
of workers, especially female ones, collectivisation was 
not perceived as bringing a substantial change in their liv-
ing conditions. Whereas before they worked for one boss, 
during the war they had seven bosses – the works council 
– and they even recalled working more than before the 
war. Some of the more reluctant ones believed that the 
militants who had been promoted to management were 
avoiding manual labour and had attained a more com-
fortable position.
The Catalan countryside and the Civil War
Just like the Region of Valencia, Catalonia had been left 
outside the scope of application of the September 1932 
Republican law on agrarian reform because its lands were 
not organised into large estates. In Catalonia the agricul-
tural upheaval was led by the Unió de Rabassaires (Small-
holders’ Union), which included sharecroppers and ten-
ant farmers, beginning with grape-growers. The 
Smallholders’ Union was under the influence of the ERC, 
the party that had governed the Generalitat since 1931. 
The URC was reformist, which is why it was poorly 
viewed by the anarchists, who had virtually no base in the 
Catalan countryside and mainly included day labourers. 
The UGT had an even smaller base.
Agrarian cooperativism had become quite widespread 
in Catalonia. In 1933, there were 540 agricultural cooper-
atives with a total of 79,000 members.19 Cooperativism 
was developed the most in the counties with a larger pro-
portion of smallholders and intensive rainfed crops 
(grapevines, olives, almonds), such as the counties of Tar-
ragona. Joint purchases of farm products and the joint 
manufacture and sale of harvests were beneficial to the 
farmers. At that time, one-fourth of the active population 
of Catalonia still worked in the primary sector, even 
though the secondary sector employed more than half the 
workers. In comparison, today the primary sector em-
ploys only 3% of the active population. In the 1930s, half 
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of the population of Catalonia lived in towns with fewer 
than 5,000 inhabitants.
The war increased the strategic importance of agricul-
ture in a country that commonly consumed foodstuffs 
from abroad but was being forced to become increasingly 
self-sufficient over the course of the conflict. Agriculture 
did not appear in the decree on collectivisations dated the 
24th of October 1936. The PSUC’s influence over the 
Smallholders’ Union rose – for example, Josep Calvet 
joined this party – but the influence of the ERC did not 
disappear, so the URC kept its organic independence 
from the two major labour unions.
On the 30th of August 1936, the Generalitat decreed 
that farmers had to unionise under a new federation of 
cooperatives which would become the Federació de Sin-
dicats Agrícoles de Catalunya (Federation of Agricul-
tural Unions of Catalonia, FSAC). All farmers had to 
turn their harvests over to the FSAC at fixed prices, and 
it, in turn, would provide the necessary foodstuffs at low 
prices. However, the FSAC was not even able to provide 
farmers with enough farm products such as rice, oil or 
potatoes. Thus, coupled with the survival of free trade, 
they tended to skim off part of the harvests turned over 
to the FSAC, giving rise to the advent of a black market 
outside fixed-price rationing.20 The winter of 1937 was 
characterised by demonstrations in the cities protesting 
the food shortages, and the situation became considera-
bly worse in 1938.
Sharecroppers and tenant farmers benefited from the 
elimination of rent paid to owners sanctioned by the Gen-
eralitat on the 1st of January 1937. The sense that the 
peasants were suffering less than the workers in the cities 
from the food shortage in an economy of scarcity in-
creased the collectivists’ efforts to impose collectivisation 
on small and medium-sized independent farmers. How-
ever, on the 2nd of September 1936, the leaders of the 
CNT had agreed that smallholders had to be respected 
and collectivisation had to be voluntary, albeit not includ-
ing large estates that could only be farmed by families 
without day labourers, and banning salaried workers and 
tenant farming.
We should distinguish between two kinds of agricul-
tural collectives: those which held all the land and farmers 
within a township, and those that combined collective 
farming in expropriated estates with private production. 
In the Baix Llobregat – and in all of Catalonia – the cases 
of L’Hospitalet and El Prat de Llobregat were exceptions 
as towns where all the lands were collectivised. The influ-
ence of the anarcho-syndicalists and the importance of 
day labourers in the Llobregat River delta can explain this 
particular situation. However, in the rest of the county all 
the other cases studied show a mixed solution, and this 
reflected the lack of enthusiasm among the farmers in the 
Baix Llobregat – under the influence of the Smallholders’ 
Union – for the wholesale collectivism promoted by the 
CNT- FAI.21
The military drafts did not seem to have many effects 
on the agricultural collectives in the Baix Llobregat, ap-
parently due to the fact that they were filled by industrial 
unemployment or the refugees from the rest of Spain. The 
salary equity of the collectives in L’Hospitalet and El Prat 
did not include equal salaries for men and women, but 
they did have own social security systems. These collec-
tives responsibly did not contribute to the rising food 
prices, in contrast to the individual farmers who tended 
to benefit from the black market. 
In the counties in the province of Girona, confiscation 
was limited to the large landowners. The ERC and PSUC 
chose to divvy up these lands, while the CNT wanted 
them to be collectively farmed. The peasants who chose to 
join a collective were in the minority. Almost all the 51 
collectivisations documented were located in the plains of 
the Empordà, Gironés and La Selva, and they totalled 
around 2,500 people. While the collective in Sant Pere 
Pescador is an example of voluntary collectivisation, the 
one in Pau was forced. However, the high degree of vol-
untary collectivisation of the lands of Girona seems con-
firmed by the fact that after May 1937, only a handful of 
members left the collectives.22 Coordination was virtually 
non-existent: not even a network of cooperation and dis-
tribution among the collectives in the region was 
achieved.
Figure 6. Poster which says “Comrade: Work and fight for the 
revolution” (1936). 105 x 75 cm. Author: Ángel L. L. 
CRAI Biblioteca Pavelló de la República (Universitat de Barcelona).
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Regarding the province of Lleida, we know that there 
was a collective in at least 20 of the 25 municipalities in 
the county of Les Garrigues, totalling around 3,102 hec-
tares. The POUM had collectivised a large modern estate 
in Raimat. Exchanges of products among collectives 
tended to become the norm. However, after September 
1937, these collectives were gradually abandoned.
It is not easy to grasp the scope of collectivisation in the 
Catalan countryside, but it is clear that individual farms 
continued to prevail. Numbers such as 297 agricultural 
collectives have been bandied about, and some people ac-
cept the CNT’s figure of 400.23 This seems excessive if we 
bear in mind that in response to a survey of the Generali-
tat, 66 municipalities declared that they had collectives, 
while 100 responded that they did not.
The most conflictive region was the southern part of 
the province of Tarragona. In the autumn of 1936, differ-
ent towns which could be regarded as part of the Popular 
Front witnessed clashes. The skirmishes between individ-
ualists and collectivists took place in different sites around 
Catalonia, but nowhere did they reach a collective tragedy 
the proportions of the one in Fatarella, a village in Terra 
Alta. The anarchists strove to impose collectivisation in 
this village, but they were expelled by the farmers, where-
upon the town came under siege with the intervention of 
control patrols that had travelled there from L’Hospitalet 
de Llobregat. When the farmers who had surrendered on 
the hill overlooking the town were murdered, the resist-
ance refused to negotiate. From Barcelona, the Generali-
tat sent a contingent of the Security and Attack Corps 
there on the 26th of January 1937. Once the town had 
been conquered, 26 residents were murdered, most of 
whom belonged to the parties of the Popular Front. The 
only way to save the others was to arrest 47 of them and 
transport them to Barcelona. They were not released from 
prison until after the events of May 1937. Neither the 
Generalitat delegates nor the public forces were able to 
fend off the carnage in Fatarella, which undermined their 
authority.24 While the anarcho-syndicalist press painted 
the events as a fascist uprising, the ERC, PSUC and URC 
condemned the bloody clash and defended the farmers 
who had opposed coerced collectivisation. Those who 
were murdered in Fatarella never appeared in the story of 
“caídos por Dios y por España” (those who fell for God 
and for Spain) written by the victors in 1939, a clear signal 
that they were considered to be on the losing side of the 
war. In late February, a clash similar to the one in Fata-
rella occurred in Centelles (Osona) which resulted in six 
deaths, but with adverse consequences for those who 
wanted to impose collectivisation.
In late February 1937, the CNT accepted an agreement 
that allowed the farmers who had previously been land-
owners to leave the collectives in El Priorat, Ribera d’Ebre 
and Terra Alta if they wanted. After the events in Fatarel-
la, the members of the UGT and the PSUC left the control 
patrols. The decision to disarm the rear-guard and dis-
solve the control patrols was related to their desire to 
avoid a repetition of events like the ones in Fatarella, but 
this was impossible until after the events of May 1937, 
when the CNT-FAI no longer held the government of the 
Generalitat and had lost the competence to ensure the 
public order, a power that had been seized by the govern-
ment of the Republic.
The PSUC did not question communal farming in gen-
eral, even though it was not the main driving force behind 
it. It was opposed to the independence of the collectives 
given the anarcho-syndicalists’ reluctance to accept the 
FSAC’s control of sales and purchases. The shortage of fi-
nancial resources parked the collectives at a dead-end 
even after they accepted control by the FSAC, which had a 
hard time combatting the black market given that it pur-
chased the harvests at the low official price to export 
them, while the real domestic prices escaped the fixed ra-
tioning prices given the widespread penury. The struggle 
against so-called speculators became the top priority.
The Region of Valencia  
and collectivisation
Agrarian collectivisations in Valencia were a smaller phe-
nomenon than what was claimed at the time.25 The 
amount of land expropriated in the Region of Valencia 
during the Spanish Civil War was 13.1% of the net area. 
This proportion contrasts with 65% of the land in the 
province of Jaén, 59.6% in the province of Ciudad Real 
and 33.5% in the province of Albacete. What is more, of 
the percentage of land expropriated in the Region of Va-
lencia, only 31.5% was actually collectivised, that is, 4% of 
the net area based on the confiscated lands. There were 
356 agricultural collectives, 264 of which belonged to the 
CNT and 69 to the UGT’s Federació de Treballadors de la 
Terra (Federation of Land Workers, FETT), while 20 
were managed jointly by the CNT and UGT.
The decree issued by the Minister of Agriculture, the 
communist Vicente Uribe, on the 7th of October 1936 
stipulated that only the estates of owners who had been 
involved in the uprising against the Republic were to be 
expropriated. This decree, which was framed as a revolu-
tionary act, was viewed as a step backward by the collec-
tivists.
The process of forming the 356 collectives was neither 
spontaneous nor as quick as has been claimed. The un-
ions and local revolutionary committees started it in the 
summer of 1936, but it lasted until early 1938. It was a het-
erogeneous phenomenon, so each unit was a case unto it-
self. The cases in which libertarian communism was pro-
claimed and the entire township was collectivised were 
few and short-lived. According to the report by Pedro 
García, Secretary General of the FETT in Valencia, in ear-
ly 1938 the land area owned by each collective did not 
even account for one-twentieth of the land seized by the 
field workers. The structure of small-scale land owner-
ship in the Region of Valencia largely explains this out-
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come, while all the forces of the Popular Front also shared 
power. We should also bear in mind the October 1936 
creation of the Federación Provincial Campesina (Pro-
vincial Federation of Farmers) backed by the PCE and the 
Republican parties. This new farmers’ union encom-
passed tenant farmers and small landowners who used to 
be members of the Catholic unions, cooperatives which 
had served as the electoral base of the now-proscribed 
Dreta Regional Valenciana (Valencian Regional Right).
The Provincial Federation of Farmers put up resistance 
to collectivisation. The violence that prevailed in the es-
tablishment of some of the agrarian collectives explains 
the subsequent reaction. The individualists had the de-
cree from the 7th of October 1936 in favour of small 
farms. The tensions between the collectivists and individ-
ualists became more frequent in the winter of 1937. The 
most serious clashes between collectivists and individual-
ists took place in Cullera on the 5th of February 1937, but 
they were not the only ones. The anarcho-syndicalists’ 
loss of influence stemming from their ministers’ depar-
ture from the government of the Republic had weakened 
the collectivists in the Region of Valencia.
However, in view of the threat to the harvests, on the 
8th of June 1937 the Minister of Agriculture, Vicente 
Uribe, recognised the collectives, offered them the aid 
they needed and halted their attrition. However, this was 
merely an interlude since the pressures on the collectives 
resumed during the autumn of 1937 and did not let up 
until 1938, when the Republican defeat was a palpable 
threat.
In the summer of 1936, both the UGT and the CNT 
chose to collectivise the expropriated lands instead of div-
vying them up, but they also declared their respect for 
small landowners. This did not mean that they were 
obeyed or that they did not come upon serious difficulties 
because of the intense localism which prevailed in the so-
cial changes in the Region of Valencia. The new Provin-
cial Federation of Farmers of the Levante created by the 
CNT did not develop standard bylaws and compatibility 
rules to unify and coordinate all of its collectives until 
June 1937. At that time, the anarcho-syndicalists were 
convinced of the evils being prompted by the lack of soli-
darity and interaction among the different units, plus 
many of the most highly trained men were already at the 
front, and the collectives had a 44% illiteracy rate. The 
wealthy collectives developed somewhat normally, while 
the poorer ones remained so throughout the entire war.
Despite the efforts of many collectives to improve and 
increase production despite the lack of fertilisers and la-
bour, the fact is that wheat production in the Region of 
Valencia dropped by 290,013 quintars (hundredweight) 
in 1937 compared to the average in the previous five-year 
period; meanwhile, rice production dropped 837,695 
quintars and orange production dropped 1,673,535 quin-
tars according to the statistics from the Ministry of Agri-
culture. However, these figures were no different in lands 
depending on whether they were confiscated or not, or 
between individually or collectively farmed lands, so that 
it is impossible to answer the question regarding the eco-
nomic results of the agrarian collectivisation process.
The fact that 60% of the agricultural production in Va-
lencia was meant for exports – especially oranges – turned 
this issue into one that extended beyond regional inter-
ests and affected the Republic’s ability to secure the cur-
rency it needed to purchase the required armaments and 
raw materials from abroad. The organisation of orange 
exports during the acute crisis prior to the war included 
two projects: the union collectivisation upheld by the 
CNT and UGT and the freedom to export with govern-
ment control. The CNT and UGT created the Consejo Le-
vantino Unificado de Exportación Agrícola (Levante 
Unified Council on Agriculture Exports, CLUEA), which 
was charged with centralising orange exports with local 
committees once the exporting and packaging companies 
had been confiscated and collectivised. The CLUEA was 
in charge of inspecting for quality, proposing prices and 
keeping watch over foreign markets. The large German 
market had already been lost, and France was in danger of 
being lost as well. The CLUEA served as an intermediary 
between the government and the producers when making 
payments for oranges, given that the government prepaid 
the CLUEA 50% of the value of exported oranges and 
gave it the remaining 50% when the product had reached 
its destination and the currency was in the hands of the 
government.
The CLUEA wanted to take advantage of the occasion 
to avoid capital evasion and rationalise a sector which had 
numerous weaknesses. However, it never reached earlier 
export levels and was at odds with the export competence 
of the FPC cooperative and free exports, while Largo Ca-
ballero’s government mistrusted an organisation in which 
it was not represented. The CLUEA’s publications are ex-
traordinarily frank, a far cry from the overwhelming 
propaganda of the period. For example, in one inspection 
it admitted the inefficacy and lack of discipline of 40% of 
the local committees which were supposed to supply the 
product, while also recognising their low technical level. 
It did not manage to make the orange season of 1937 suc-
cessful because it would have needed more time to solve 
the problems, but neither the government of the Repub-
lic, especially after Juan Negrín’s cabinet was formed, nor 
the FPC or PCE gave it the chance to since they created 
the Central d’Exportació d’Agris (Agriculture Export 
Headquarters), thus putting an end to the CLUEA’s pow-
er and the hegemony of the unions in such a key econom-
ic sector.
Industrial collectivisation unleashed fewer controver-
sies in the press in the Region of Valencia than what 
agrarian collectivisation aroused. However, this does not 
mean that the number of collectivised companies and 
worker control was lower, given that they achieved a 
sweeping predominance in both the four provincial capi-
tals and in towns like Sagunt, Alcoy, Elda, Villena Crevil-
lent, Bocairent and Xixona, as well as in Vilajoiosa and 
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Benicarló. While we have proof that there was a clear cli-
mate of violence around the revolutionary changes in the 
world of farming, there did not seem to be as many con-
flicts in the industrial world. It was quite common for the 
owners to continue working as technicians in family-
owned companies. The collectivised companies in Valen-
cia, Elda and Villena were managed by joint UGT-CNT 
committees. The main difficulties facing industry in Va-
lencia stemmed from raw materials, transports and mar-
ket contraction.26
The textile, metallurgical and paper industries in Alcoy 
were totally collectivised and trained on the war, while 
private trade was replaced by a consumer cooperative. 
With around 40,000 inhabitants, Alcoy was an old indus-
trial nucleus and a bastion of the CNT during the Civil 
War.27 The blast furnaces in Sagunt were collectivised by 
the anarcho-syndicalists, and something similar hap-
pened with the Unión Naval de Levante in Valencia, as 
well as with the city’s water, gas, electricity and transport 
services. Some sources mention 15 industrial collectives 
in Valencia in November 1937, but this seems like an 
overly modest figure.
As the anarcho-syndicalist Minister of Industry, Joan 
Peiró prepared a decree to seize but not nationalise large 
companies. The State remained as the advisor to the un-
ion management; however, the Minister of the Treasury, 
Juan Negrín, and the communists were opposed to this. 
Thus, the decree dated the 23rd of February 1937 stated 
the State’s right to seizure, but with a workers’ oversight 
committee in a regulation later handed down by Peiró in 
March. Negrín did not like this provision, as he called on 
more power for the government in exchange for financial 
support for the companies. After the summer of 1938, na-
tionalisation, which nullified worker management, pro-
gressed more quickly in the Regional of Valencia, just as it 
did in Catalonia.
In early 1938, the industry adapted for war production 
included 18 companies in 12 towns employing 7,271 
workers. These local companies were joined by those that 
had been transferred by the government of the Republic 
from the centre of Spain to the Region of Valencia, such 
as the bullet manufacturing facility from Toledo and the 
aviation supply company from near Madrid, which were 
moved to Novelda and Elx. These transferred industries 
employed more than 4,500 workers in seven companies 
located in three towns. In early 1938, 40% of the war ma-
teriel factories in the Region of Valencia belonged to the 
Republican State, while 60% were led by workers commit-
tees or their former owners. The proportion held by the 
State kept rising, but 30% of the local war factories – not 
counting the ones that had just been created by the Re-
publican government – were not nationalised. There were 
cases in which the old owners strove to recover control 
over their companies via their State nationalisation as op-
posed to the workers’ committees, usually from the CNT, 
that managed them now. This was the case of two toy fac-
tories in Dènia which had been converted to producing 
armaments. There were also owners who continued to 
oversee their factories, such as the Cooperativa 
Metal·lúrgica d’Elda (Metallurgical Cooperation of Elda), 
made up of the business owners, and they continued 
working for the government without being subjected to 
workers control or State nationalisation.
In early 1938, around 13,000 people worked in war 
manufacturing in the Region of Valencia, compared to 
60,000 in Catalonia. Even though their output in terms of 
volume was lower than in Catalonia, their capacity for 
bullet production was higher and their grenade produc-
tion was equivalent to half that of Catalonia.
Despite the maritime blockade and bombardments, 
the industries located in Valencia – especially the weap-
ons industries – suffered less from the trade restrictions 
than agriculture, especially exports. They also had the 
materials and labour they needed, given that the work-
places were militarised, while there was no distinction in 
the case of farmers.
Collectivisations and the Council  
of Aragon
As the columns of militiamen from Catalonia commanded 
by the anarchists Buenaventura Durruti, Antonio Ortiz 
and Domingo Ascaso occupied eastern Aragon, the CNT 
was reconstructed in the region, individuals regarded as 
right-wing who had not fled Aragon in the hands in the en-
emies of the Republic were liquidated, and collectivisations 
were encouraged by the libertarians. However, the columns 
from Catalonia did not manage to conquer either Huesca 
or Teruel and were halted before reaching Zaragoza. A long 
front in the guise of a line of trenches and positions was 
stabilised and remained intact until the Battle of Belchite in 
August 1937, but this Republican offensive did not manage 
to break the front. The Republican conquest of Teruel in 
early 1938 lasted only briefly before it was conquered by the 
nationals in the month of February.
The anarcho-syndicalists were the ones who promoted 
collectivisation in Aragon. The majority of those armed 
apostles were from the cities – even though some had ru-
ral roots – and they came nurturing the dream of the pur-
ported natural egalitarianism of the countryside. What 
they proposed and imposed might have been attractive 
for landless day labourers but was not very suitable for the 
thousands of small landowners in a region where small 
taxpayers predominated.28 Those who voluntarily offered 
to jointly cultivate everyone’s lands together were joined 
by those who did so under coercion. Just as in other plac-
es, the ban on land leasing and salaried work pushed the 
peasants to join the collectives, although small landown-
ers did not disappear.
Throughout the entire summer of 1936, there was con-
fusion between collectivisation, “comprehensive social-
ism” and confiscations to maintain the columns of mili-
tiamen. As Durruti’s column in the newspaper Frente said 
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on the 27th of August 1936: “It is a law of life that armies 
live off of the land they have conquered”.
We should avoid projecting anachronisms. Women’s 
liberation was not part of the revolutionary process. The 
militiawomen – an image that proliferated in the graphic 
propaganda from the day – were soon removed from the 
front and sent to work in the auxiliary services further 
back or in the rear-guard. Aragonese farmwomen were 
absent from the local revolutionary committees and from 
the management of the collectives, even though they kept 
working the fields. The male breadwinners were the only 
players in the change process. A minimum wage was set 
at ten pesetas for men and six for women.
Localism endangered a commercialised economy, and 
on the 16th of October the Consejo de Defensa de Aragón 
(Aragon Defence Council) was established in Bujaraloz, 
with Durruti’s consent. It was presided over by Joaquín As-
caso Budría, a worker from Zaragoza, and the composition 
of this council was exclusively anarchist. Its mission was to 
coordinate and regulate collectivisation, to overcome the 
atomisation of power and to put an end to the excesses of 
the columns that occupied the territory. The Generalitat de 
Catalunya, which was in charge of the Aragon front, disap-
proved of it. The government of the Republic, presided 
over by the socialist Largo Caballero, also resisted official 
recognition for the Aragon Defence Council. However, 
with the entry of four anarcho-syndicalist ministers into 
Largo Caballero’s cabinet, recognition of that regional au-
tonomous power inevitably came on the 25th of December 
1936. In exchange, representatives of the other forces of the 
Popular Front joined the Aragon Defence Council, but the 
anarchists’ hegemony remained untouched. Even Ascaso 
was appointed delegate of the government of the Republic 
in Aragon, so the anarcho-syndicalists apparently contrib-
uted to restoring the power of the Republican State in that 
region. The municipal councils were remodelled to reflect 
the same composition as the government of the Republic. 
The headquarters of the Aragon Defence Council was in 
the town of Caspe.
To strengthen the collectivisation process, in February 
of 1937 the Aragon Defence Council called a congress of 
the new Federació Regional de Col·lectivitats Agràries 
d’Aragó (Regional Federation of Agrarian Collectives of 
Aragon). Four hundred delegates from 275 collectives 
claiming to encompass 141,430 farmers attended. They 
decided to create a rural savings and loan, and the secre-
tary of the new federation was the schoolteacher José Ma-
villa. There are no figures on the participation of the 
UGT’s FETT in the collectivisation process in Aragon, 
but the socialists condemned the fact that the collectivisa-
tions were not voluntary while also censuring the total he-
gemony of the anarchists.
The more radical sectors were opposed to the export 
monopoly that the Aragon Defence Council wished to 
have. Oil, almonds and saffron had to be exported in order 
to secure other foodstuffs needed. The port of Tarragona 
witnessed the sale of 551,000 kilos of oil, 20,000 kilos of al-
monds and 789 kilos of saffron, and 600,000 kilos of food 
were imported. The most collectivised county, Binefar-
Monzón, accused the Aragon Defence Council of “coun-
ter-revolutionary efforts” and strove to act autonomously.
After the anarcho-syndicalists left the government of 
the Republic, a decree dated the 11th of August 1937 dis-
solved the Aragon Defence Council and replaced it with a 
general governor, while the municipal councils were re-
placed by government management committees without 
the anarchists. The protest by the secretary general of the 
CNT, Marià Rodríguez Vázquez, before ministers Irujo 
and Zugazagoitia was futile. The arrests of anarchists be-
gan, accompanied by the dissolution of collectives by the 
eleventh division, led by the communist Líster. Every-
thing ended in March of 1938, when the Aragon front fell 
and 40,000 refugees fled to Catalonia, which was also 
partly occupied by the enemy.
Regarding the issue of collectivisations, since 2013 
there has been a 300-page monograph on the village of 
Queretes in the county of Matarranya, in the province of 
Teruel.29 This experiment, spearheaded by the anarcho-
syndicalists, which were a minority in the town, began to 
dissolve in August 1937, but it lasted until December of 
the same year.
The Republican defeat put an end to the experience of 
collectivisations in Catalonia, the Region of Valencia and 
the eastern part of Aragon. The phenomenon, which is 
inseparable from the Civil War and the exceptional con-
text that it generated, cannot be studied outside of that 
framework, which conditioned and ultimately deter-
mined it.
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